

# VALUE FACTOR: IN-N-OUT VS. SHAKE SHACK

**Matt Wagner — Associate Director, Research**  
 11/11/2019

What’s better: In-N-Out, the West Coast burger chain with a cult-like following, or Shake Shack, the burger joint founded by famous New York restaurateur Danny Meyer?

Members of WisdomTree’s research team could (hypothetically) go back and forth, arguing the merits of either: taste, cost, atmosphere, beverage offerings—and on and on.


But why have this conversation at all? They are both *really good* and handily beat the average burger.

There are many ways to judge a burger; there are just as many ways to determine what makes up a good investment [fact or](#).

There are dozens of metrics that have historically been used to capture the [value premium](#)—all standard measures of value (price relative to [book value](#), [dividends](#), [earnings](#), [cash flow](#), etc.) have been found to outperform the market averages over the long run, with each outperforming over different periods of time.

## Best Value Measure Varies by Decade—Dividends Were Strongest in Latest Decade

### Average Annual Excess Returns vs. Total Market



Sources: WisdomTree, Kenneth French Data Library, Zephyr StyleADVISOR; data from 12/31/1959 to 8/31/2019. Time period selected based on data availability. Book-to-Price, Dividends-to-Price, Earnings-to-Price and Cash Flow-to-Price are the top 20 portfolios for each respective ratio from the Kenneth French Data Library. The total market portfolio is representative of all publicly listed U.S. equities firms incorporated in the United States and listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Past performance is not indicative of future returns.

### Performance Summaries

The table below shows the performance of the top-[quintile](#) portfolios on each respective ratio since 1951. The first thing to note is that each measure of value outperformed the returns of the total market on both an absolute and a [risk-adjusted basis](#).

Investors familiar with the value factor should not be surprised to see that three of the four portfolios had at least 100 [bas](#)

is points (bps) of incremental risk (standard deviation) over the market. This supports the **risk-based argument** of why the value factor exists and why it should continue to provide excess returns in the future. Value investors are incurring greater **volatility** by investing in distressed or cyclical businesses; therefore, they should achieve greater returns.

The only measure of value that outperformed with lower risk was the dividends-to-price (**dividend yield**) portfolio. It had lower standard deviation, **down capture** of just 67% and a **beta** of 0.74 to the total market.

**How can this outperformance be possible?**

In addition to the risk-based arguments for why value “works,” there are some **behavior-based arguments**. For example, investors get overly excited about **growth** stocks with seemingly endless potential, many of which pay low or no dividends. Investors typically bid up these companies’ prices, causing subsequent underperformance against underpriced high dividend payers. And these dividend payers tend to be favored during periods of market volatility when the safety of a tangible dividend payment is typically preferred to the unknown of future earnings from growth companies.

**Value Portfolios—Correlations, Return and Risk**

Analysis Period: 6/30/1951–8/31/2019	Annualized Summary Statistics			vs. Book-to-Price	vs. Total Market		
	Return	Standard Deviation	Sharpe Ratio	Correlation	Up Capture	Down Capture	Beta
Book-to-Price	14.04%	17.56%	0.56	1.00	114.35%	100.98%	1.04
Dividends-to-Price	12.04%	13.88%	0.56	0.83	78.11%	66.62%	0.74
Earnings-to-Price	15.48%	16.45%	0.68	0.91	113.81%	93.58%	0.99
Cash Flow-to-Price	14.65%	15.81%	0.66	0.90	107.13%	90.03%	0.95
Total Market	10.94%	14.71%	0.46	0.87	100.00%	100.00%	1.00

Sources: WisdomTree, Kenneth French Data Library, Zephyr StyleADVISOR; data from 6/30/1951 to 8/31/2019. Time period selected based on data availability. Book-to-Price, Dividends-to-Price, Earnings-to-Price and Cash Flow-to-Price are the top 20 portfolios for each respective ratio from the Kenneth French Data Library. The total market portfolio is representative of all publicly listed U.S. equities firms incorporated in the United States and listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Past performance is not indicative of future returns.

Of all the maximum drawdowns over the past few decades, the dividend yield portfolio has offered the greatest protection in five out of the six periods. From a behavioral finance perspective, this may make it easier to hold the dividend yield portfolio over the long run, allowing investors to capture the tough-to-stomach value premium.

Maximum Drawdown	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	12/31/09–8/31/19
Book-to-Price	-22.52%	-34.54%	-27.62%	-21.81%	-58.77%	-29.40%
Dividends-to-Price	-21.42%	-32.39%	-18.84%	-17.35%	-65.02%	-11.97%
Earnings-to-Price	-22.64%	-42.43%	-25.93%	-26.63%	-51.06%	-18.61%
Cash Flow-to-Price	-22.83%	-31.29%	-23.95%	-22.64%	-51.36%	-20.21%
Total Market	-23.04%	-46.42%	-29.91%	-17.39%	-50.39%	-17.71%

Sources: WisdomTree, Kenneth French Data Library, Zephyr StyleADVISOR; data from 12/31/1959 to 8/31/2019. Time period selected based on data availability. Book-to-Price, Dividends-to-Price, Earnings-to-Price and Cash Flow-to-Price are the top 20 portfolios for each respective ratio from the Kenneth French Data Library. The total market portfolio is representative of all publicly listed U.S. equities firms incorporated in the United States and listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. Green shading indicates less severe maximum drawdown relative to the total market.

A debate rages on as to *why* these premiums exist, but each has exhibited a pattern of outperforming the total market portfolio.

**Conclusion**

A good indicator of a robust factor is its flexibility within slightly different definitions and the economic rationale for its existence.

We have shown the absolute and risk-adjusted outperformance of four different commonly accepted definitions of value and provided the main arguments for why they exist.

Dividend yield was the most defensive measure of value, given its lower risk characteristics. The other measures of value were riskier and more pro-cyclical and had higher absolute returns.

There are a few notable drawbacks to each<sup>1</sup>:

- **Dividend Yield**—Had the lowest absolute returns of the four value measures, and cannot value firms that do not pay dividends (approx. 23% weight of [Russell 3000 Index](#)).

- **Price-to-Earnings**—Earnings can be manipulated by management, and this metric fails to account for companies with negative earnings (approx. 4% weight of Russell 3000 Index).
- **Price-to-Cash Flow**—Had a higher portfolio turnover than other value metrics, and cannot value companies with negative cash flow (approx. 3% weight of Russell 3000 Index).
- **Price-to-Book**—Book value uses historical costs for asset values, does not account for intangible assets and can be distorted by share buybacks and dividends (approx. 5% weight of Russell 3000 Index in negative book value).

Depending on investor risk tolerance or view on what stage of the business cycle we may be in, the lower volatility and defensive characteristics of a dividends-based approach to value may be attractive, particularly for pairing with a value approach that is more pro-cyclical, such as price-to-book.

So maybe the debate should not be In-N-Out vs. Shake Shack, but rather pairing a ShackBurger with some In-N-Out animal-style fries.

<sup>1</sup>Sources for the Russell 3000 Index data points: WisdomTree, FactSet; data as of 9/30/19.

For standardized performance and the most recent month-end performance click [here](#) NOTE, this material is intended for electronic use only. Individuals who intend to print and physically deliver to an investor must print the monthly performance report to accompany this blog.

For more investing insights, check out our [Economic & Market Outlook](#)

View the online version of this article [here](#).

## **IMPORTANT INFORMATION**

**U.S. investors only: Click [here](#) to obtain a WisdomTree ETF prospectus which contains investment objectives, risks, charges, expenses, and other information; read and consider carefully before investing.**

There are risks involved with investing, including possible loss of principal. Foreign investing involves currency, political and economic risk. Funds focusing on a single country, sector and/or funds that emphasize investments in smaller companies may experience greater price volatility. Investments in emerging markets, currency, fixed income and alternative investments include additional risks. Please see prospectus for discussion of risks.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. This material contains the opinions of the author, which are subject to change, and should not to be considered or interpreted as a recommendation to participate in any particular trading strategy, or deemed to be an offer or sale of any investment product and it should not be relied on as such. There is no guarantee that any strategies discussed will work under all market conditions. This material represents an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This material should not be relied upon as research or investment advice regarding any security in particular. The user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of the information provided herein. Neither WisdomTree nor its affiliates, nor Foreside Fund Services, LLC, or its affiliates provide tax or legal advice. Investors seeking tax or legal advice should consult their tax or legal advisor. Unless expressly stated otherwise the opinions, interpretations or findings expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of WisdomTree or any of its affiliates.

The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or component of any financial instruments or products or indexes. None of the MSCI information is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The MSCI information is provided on an "as is" basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. MSCI, each of its affiliates and each entity involved in compiling, computing or creating any MSCI information (collectively, the "MSCI Parties") expressly disclaims all warranties. With respect to this information, in no event shall any MSCI Party have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including loss profits) or any other damages ([www.msci.com](http://www.msci.com))

Jonathan Steinberg, Jeremy Schwartz, Rick Harper, Christopher Gannatti, Bradley Krom, Tripp Zimmerman, Michael Barrer, Anita Rausch, Kevin Flanagan, Brendan Loftus, Joseph Tenaglia, Jeff Weniger, Matt Wagner, Alejandro Saltiel, Ryan Krystopowicz, Kara Marciscano, Jianing Wu, Brian Manby and Scott Welch are registered representatives of Foreside Fund Services, LLC.

WisdomTree Funds are distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC, in the U.S. only.

You cannot invest directly in an index.